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First Amendment Facelift?: Rehnquist Court
Crafts New Scrutiny Level for ContentNeutral, Speech Restricting Injunctions in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center

Recently, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center,' the United States
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of an injunction that had
completely prohibited antiabortion protestors from coming within a
thirty-six foot "speech-free" buffer zone around an abortion clinic.'
Petitioners, Judy Madsen8 , Ed Martin, and Shirley Hobbs, are officers
of Rescue America4 and members of Operation Rescue.' The predominant goal of these two antiabortion, activist organizations is to shut
down abortion clinics throughout the country' Respondents, Women's
Health Center, Inc., Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc., EPOC Clinic,
Inc., and Central Florida Women's Health Organization, Inc., operate
abortion clinics throughout central Florida.' The crusade against the
Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc. ("Aware Women") of Melbourne,
Florida and numerous other abortion clinics in central Florida was

1. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
2. The trial court's modified injunction prohibited the petitioners in Madsen from
engaging in the following acts: "(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing,
patrolling, demonstrating or entering that portion of the public right-of-way or private
property within [36] feet of the property line of the clinic...." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522.
3. Shortly before the Court handed down the decision, Judy Madsen said that "she has
God on her side," and "[niow she wants the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in her
corner, too." Elsa C. Arnett, Abortion Clinic War: Free Speech vs. Access, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1994, at Al.
4. Brief for Respondents at 1, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (No.
93-880).
5. Respondents Brief at 2 n.2, Madsen (No. 93-880).
6. Indeed, the Florida trial court that issued the later September 30, 1992 permanent
injunction, see infra note 12 and accompanying text, made a factual finding that
petitioner's propaganda specifically declared that their intention was to "'[p]hysically close
down abortion mills' by encircling them with thousands of protesters and blocking access
to [abortion] facilities." Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 667 n.3
(Fla. 1993).
7. 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
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mounted by Operation Rescue in 19918 shortly after the arrival of
Operation Rescue's newest office in central Florida.9 Picketing and
demonstrating by antiabortion protestors led Women's Health Center to
ask a Florida state court to enjoin Operation Rescue and others from
engaging in certain activities against Aware Women, its patients and
staff.'0 On October 25, 1991, the court entered a temporary injunction." Women's Health Center requested and received long-term relief
in the form of a permanent injunction almost a year later, on September
30, 1992.12 Despite the permanent injunction, protestors continued to
impede access to the clinic by congregating on the street leading up to
the clinic and marching in front of the clinic's driveways."8 Roughly six
months later, after scores of complaints by Women's Health Center and
extensive evidentiary hearings, Robert B. McGregor, a Seminole County
trial judge, amended the inadequate permanent injunction. He
concluded that prior orders had "proved insufficient 'to protect the
health, safety and rights of women in Brevard and Seminole County,
Florida, and surrounding counties seeking access to [medical and
counseling] services. '""'4 This modified injunction prohibited a broader
array of antiabortion protest activities' and, consequently, drew
8. Respondent's Brief at 1, Madsen (No. 93-880).
9. Id. Incidentally, Petitioners Madsen, Martin and Hobbs were identified in the antiabortion literature as the persons to telephone or contact for information regarding
Operation Rescue's activities in Florida. Id.
10. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
11. Id. This rather narrow temporary injunction imposed restrictions including no
obstruction of the entrance or exit from any abortion clinic in Brevard and Seminole
County and no physical abuse of any person entering or leaving an abortion clinic. Id. at
667 n.1.
12. Id. at 666-67. The permanent injunction encompassed virtually the identical
language of the earlier temporary order of October 25, 1991. Id. at 667 n.4.
13. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
14. Id. (quoting Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667 (citations omitted)).
15. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521 n.1. In addition to petitioners Madsen, Martin and
Hobbs, the amended injunction was directed at "Operation Rescue, Operation Rescue
America, Operation Goliath, their officers, agents, members, employees, and servants, and
... Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall Terry,... and all persons acting in concert or
participation with them, or on their behalf." Id.
The April 8, 1993 amended order had nine sections that banned specific activities. Id.
at 2522 n.1 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 669). Section one prohibited these
groups from entering the premises and property of Aware Woman at all times. Id. Section
two prohibited these groups from obstructing or interfering with access to, entrance and
exit from any building or parking lot of Aware Woman at all times. Id. Section three
forbid these particular persons at all times from "congregating, picketing, patrolling,
demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private property within
[361 feet of the property line" of Aware Woman. Id. Section four imposed noise
restrictions, including but limited to no singing, chanting or use of sound amplification
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significant from Operation Rescue."6 The Florida Supreme Court heard
Operation Rescue's challenge in Operation Rescue v. Women's Health
Center,17 found the injunction content-neutral, applied intermediate

scrutiny, and upheld the amended injunction."' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard a separate challenge for
the same injunction in Cheffer v. McGregor'9 shortly before the Florida
Supreme Court announced its decision in OperationRescue. The Court
of Appeals, however, found the injunction content-based, applied
heightened scrutiny, and struck down the injunction.2" The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the tension between
the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals over
the appropriateness of Judge McGregor's amended state court injunction.

equipment, during surgical procedures, recovery periods, and during the hours of 7:30 a.m.
through noon, on Mondays through Saturdays. 626 So. 2d at 669. Section five prohibited
these groups, within an area of 300 feet of Aware Woman, from physically approaching any
persons seeking services of Aware Woman unless they consented. Id. Section six, aimed
toward protecting the homes of the clinic's employees, prohibited these groups at all times
from "congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound
amplification equipment within [3001 feet of the residence[s] of any of the [respondents']
employees..." Id. Section seven prohibited them at all times from "physically abusing,
grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting
persons entering or leaving, working at or using the services at the [respondents] Clinic
.... " Id. Section eight prohibited them at all times from "harassing, intimidating or
physically abusing, assaulting or threatening any present or former doctor, health care
professional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer who assists in providing services
at the [Aware Woman] clinic." 626 So. 2d at 669. Finally, Section nine, a no instigation
vehicle, prohibited them at all times from "encouraging, inciting, or securing other persons
to commit any of the prohibited acts" contained in the amended injunction. Id.
Petitioners did not challenge provisions one, two, seven, eight and nine of Judge
McGregor's amended injunction. Madsen,, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 n.5.
Of the remaining four challenged provisions, only Section three regarding the 36 foot
"speech-free" buffer zone will be discussed in this note with limited reference to the
additional contested provisions.
16. Operation Rescue believed Judge McGregoer's amended order raised several issues
under the United States Constitution and claimed that sections 3 through 6, see note 15
and accompanying text, violated thier right to freedom of speech, freedom of association,
equal protection, and the free exercise of religion. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 669.
17. 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993).
18. Id. at 675-76. Florida's Supreme Court applied the classic time, place, and manner
restriction analysis from Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983), and concluded that the amended injunction passed muster. Id. at 673. See also
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); United States Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
19. 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993).
20. Id. at 712.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, upheld the
establishment of a thirty-six foot "speech-free" buffer zone around the
public property portions of Aware Woman. 2
Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, First Amendment rights, while
technically guaranteed, have been balanced the rival interests of states.
Consequently, freedom of speech, while secured by the Constitution, does
not confer an absolute right to speak. The State may punish those who
abuse this freedom by speaking. For example, in 1878, in Reynolds u.
United States,22 the Supreme Court cautioned that the guarantees of
the First Amendment remain subject to regulation for the protection of
society.' With foundations like these in place, the Court was braced
for a future of resolving clashes between these two competing institutions. In 1939, in Schneider v. New Jersey,' the Court dealt with
ordinances from four separate municipalities that banned or greatly
restricted the dissemination of handbills.25 In invalidating the regulations, the Court insisted that when a government violation of rights is
asserted, the courts must look closely toward the effect of the challenged
legislation and must assess the substance of the reasons offered for the
legislation.2

A year later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,27 the Court,

relying on Reynolds, demanded that the power to regulate must be
exercised in a way that does not unduly infringe First Amendment
freedoms. 2 Broad guidelines, like those set forth in Schneider and
Cantwell, were finally given in Shelton v. Tucker.'

Reenlarging

constitutional safeguards, the Court in Shelton maintained that, even
though government interests may be significant, those interests could
not be "pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end [could] be more narrowly achieved."'0 The Court
in Shelton essentially instructed future courts to pay closer attention to
the fit between the objectives of a regulation and the restrictions

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Madsen, 114 S. Ct at 2527.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 16466.
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Id. at 154-58.
Id. at 161.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).

28. Id. at 304. Cantwell and Schneider also form the beginning of the modem time,
place and manner of regulations analysis. This note will also demonstrate that Justice
Rehnquist's new standard for speech-restricting injunctions, see note 89 and accompanying
text, evolved from this same line of cases. Many courts in the modem era continue to
apply time, place, and manner analysis even to injunctions.
29. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
30. Id. at 488 (alteration in original).
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imposed by it. The refinement and restatement of tenets applicable to
injunctive relief ran a parallel course to the establishment of general
principles guiding the confrontation between protected personal rights
and state interests. In 1928, the Court in Swift & Co. v. United
States3" explained that an action for an injunction dealt primarily with
future violations rather than past violations."' In 1953, modest gloss
was added to Swift & Co. by United States v. W.T Grant Co."3 when
the Court held that a court should only issue an injunction if there is a
cognizable danger of recurrent violation." Major developments in this
area, that eventually spawned the standard for Madsen, continued in a
series of decisions focussed on civil rights. In 1956, the Virginia
Legislature amended several state statutes to make the activities of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP")
fall within the definition of improper solicitation of legal business under
Virginia law.'3 Fiery complaints by the NAACP were heard in the
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button."6 Justice Brennan, writing for a
majority of the Court, held the Virginia statutes unconstitutional, noting
that the activities of the NAACP were protected by the First Amendment.37 Importantly, the Court noted that Virginia's statutes failed to
advance any significant state interests and maintained, relying in part
on Shelton and Schneider, that "[biroad prophylactic rules in the area of
free expression are suspect."' Rather, according to the Court, "(pirecision of regulationmust be the touchstone in an area so closely touching
our most precious freedoms."'9 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the
University of New York,' teachers challenged the constitutionality of
New York's anticommunism statutes in 1967. In this case, the Court
embraced Button's "precision of regulation" requirement and declared
that since "First Amendment freedoms need breathing space, government [could] regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 1 The
language of Button and its progeny later proved to be the harbinger for

31.

276 U.S. 311 (1928).

32. Id. at 326 (citing Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Mayor and Alderman of Vicksburg,
185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902)). This is not to say that past violations are irrelevant. Their
importance in Madsen is undoubted.
33.

345 U.S. 629 (1953).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 633.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 422-24 (1963).
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Id. at 444. The Fourteenth Amendment also protected the NAACPs activities. Id.
Id. at 438 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)).
Id. (emphasis added).
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Id. at 603 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
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Madsen's novel approach. While past decisions which narrowed the
breach of state interest-based regulation in the protected rights arena
dealt predominately with ordinances, in 1968, Carroll v. President &
Commissioners of Princess Anne4 2 added injunctive relief to the kettle.
Petitioners in Carroll were identified a white supremacist organization' which hosted rallies, amplified by a public address system, in the
township of Princess Anne, Maryland." Speeches at these rallies were
militantly racist, targeting primarily African-Americans and JewishAmericans with language that was insulting, threatening and derogatory.' Officials of the county and township sought injunctive relief."
Justice Fortas, further tightening past precedent, declared that an "order
issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted
by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public
order."
Reiterating Shelton's requirement, the Court in Carroll
maintained that the State could not regulate in ways that broadly
quelled personal liberties when the end could be more narrowly
achieved.4" Some form of narrow tailoring was thus demanded in this
context. In 1979, the Court in Califano v. Yamasaki,4 laying more
groundwork for Madsen, reiterated the general rule, independent from
First Amendment considerations, that "injunctive relief should be no
more burdensome to the defendants than necessary to provide complete
relief to the plaintiffs.' ° The stage was thus set for NAACP u.
Claiborne Hardware Co.51 In 1966, a local branch of the NAACP
launched a boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. 2 The NAACP wanted civic and business leaders to comply with an
extensive list of demands for racial justice and equality.s The
merchants filed an action for damages and sought to enjoin any future
boycotts." The Mississippi Supreme Court found the boycott illegal

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

393 U.S. 175 (1968).
Id. at 176. They were formally called the National States Rights Party. Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 183-84 (citing Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488).
442 U.S. 682 (1979).
Id. at 702.
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.
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because of the presence of force, violence, and threats.'
The merchants' action eventually reached the United States Supreme Court
which found the nonviolent elements of the NAACP's activities entitled
to protection.s The Court, however, held that the First Amendment
has no refuge for violence.'
Justice Stevens, relying on Button,
Carroll,and Keyishian, wrote that when sanctionable conducts "occurs
in the context of constitutionally protected activity ... 'precision of
regulation' is demanded."59 Curiously, evolvement of the constitutional
framework that formed the background of the Court's unprecedented
decision in Madsen essentially ended with Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in ClaiborneHardware Co.
In Madsen, the Supreme Court was presented, in addition to those
series of decisions concerning speech-restricting injunctions, with two
established legal standards applicable to restrictions on protected speech.
On the one hand, the Court of Appeals in Cheffer maintained that Judge
McGregor's "viewpoint-specific restriction"'0 demanded "strict scrutiny"
and was neither necessary to serve a compelling state interest nor
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."1 On the other hand, the Florida
Supreme Court in OperationRescue found Judge McGregor's amended
injunction a content-neutral restriction, opted for "intermediate
scrutiny," and applied a classic time, place, and manner analysis to the
modified order." The Supreme Court, however, adopted neither of

55. Id. at 894.
56. Id. at 916 (citing Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971)).
57. Id.

58. Justice Stevens's point is that violent conduct is not protected but with other
implicitly nonviolent conduct subject to sanction, precision of regulation is necessary.

59. Id. (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
60. The court in Cheffer used this term. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th
Cir. 1993).
61. The Eleventh Circuit took the "strict scrutiny" route. Id. This standard, applicable
to content-based restrictions, requires that the restriction be necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980).

Petitioners in Madsen also argued that the amended injunction was content-based but
did not specifically ask for the heightened scrutiny of Perry Local Educators Ass'n. See
Petitioners' Brief at 3, Madsen (No. 93-880). Rather, petitioners, in addition to arguing
that the injunction was a prior restraint, contended that the injunction was not "couched
in the narrowest terms that [would] accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order." Petitioners' Brief at
2, Madsen (No. 93-880) (alteration in original). See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
62. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 671-73 (Fla. 1993). See

also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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these traditional First Amendment scrutiny tests. The Court in Madsen,
after apparently acceding to the Florida Supreme Court's determination
that the area outside Aware Woman was a public forum,'3 began its
analysis in the same fashion as required by either of the two standards.
The Court, as a threshold matter, looked first to the trial court's purpose
in promulgating the amended injunctione to determine if the restrictions the order imposed were content-neutral." A regulation is neutral
when its objectives are unrelated to the content of expression, even if
incidental effects are felt by some but not others." Petitioners vehemently maintained that the state court's order was viewpoint based
since it was an injunction, and not an ordinance, that only restricted the

Support for the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Operation Rescue included: Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (ordinance imposed complete ban on targeted residential
picketing was appropriate where abortion opponents demonstrated outside doctor's home);
Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1991) (injunction
constitutional where read as creating 500 foot buffer zone around clinic and workers'
homes); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989) (ordinance banning bullhorns and
loudspeakers within 150 feet of abortion clinic upheld); Portland Feminist Women's Health
Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (injunction limiting picketing
outside abortion clinic upheld); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530 (1991)
(injunction limiting demonstrations outside abortion clinic upheld).
Respondents in Madsen argued that Judge McGregor's amended injunction was a
legitimate time, place and manner regulation of Petitioners' activities. See Respondents'
Brief at 14-37, Madsen (No. 93-880).
63. Historically, the starting point for any curtailment of protected speech or conduct
under the First Amendment is to characterize the forum in which expressive activity takes
place. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
(defining public forums as those places immemorially held in trust for the public); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (defining limited public forums as those that state has
opened for expressive activity); United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114 (1981) (defining non-public forums as those not traditionally open for communicative activity).
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion never specifically reasoned that the arena used by
the protestors was a public forum. Instead, the Chief Justice laconically noted the Florida
Supreme Court's finding that "the forum at issue, which consist[ed] of public streets,
sidewalks, and rights-of-way, [was] a traditional public forum." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522
(citing OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 671). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480
(1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 4546; Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
64. The dominating consideration is the government's objective in enforcing the
regulation. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
65. Id. at 791.
66. Id. 'The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility - or favoritism towards the underlying message expressed." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992). See also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)
(plurality opinion); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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speech of antiabortion protestors,5 7 In rejecting this contention, the
Court reasoned that accepting petitioners' claim would result in
pigeonholing essentially every injunction as content-based. Rather, the
very nature of injunctions is that they apply only to particular groups,
Accordingly, injunctions
their activities and even their speech."
regulate speech of a particular group not because of that group's beliefs
or opinions but rather because of their previous actions in a dispute
between parties.e Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the state
court did not levy restrictions on petitioners because of their antiabortion
message but because they had repeatedly violated the court's original
order."' Accordingly, the Court maintained the content-neutral status
of the order and denied application of heightened scrutiny.7 1 The chief
justice then quietly and expeditiously dismissed petitioners' steadfast
contention that prior restraint analysis should be adopted.7 2 Interestingly, the Court then commented hypothetically that if this were a
content-neutral ordinance, instead of an injunctive order, then courts
would assess its constitutionality under the time, place and manner
criteria."s Their hypothetical appraisal went no further and the Court
summarily declined adoption of intermediate scrutiny74 similar to its

67. Petitioners's Brief at 28, Madsen (No. 93-880); Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
68. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
69. Id. Generally, parties that seek injunctions are asserting a violation of their rights
and the courts are responsible for "fashioning a remedy for [that] specific deprivation." Id.
(alteration in original).
70. Id. at 2523-24. For further justification, the Court, relying on Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312 (1988), noted that simply because the amended injunction encompassed a group
with a particular viewpoint did not itself render the order viewpoint based. 114 S. Ct. at
2524.
71. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24. See also PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
72. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2. The chief justice reasoned that petitioners were
not completely prevented from expressing their message but, instead, only "prohibited from
expressing it within the [thirty-six] foot buffer zone." Id. (alteration in original). He
acknowledged that prior restraints do often take the form of injunction but that "[n]ot all
injunctions which may incidentally affect expression, however, are prior restraints'" as the
term has been used in previous decisions. Id. (citing Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,
445 U.S. 308 (1980)); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
For more information on injunctions restricting speech as prior restraints, see Bering v.
Share, 721 P.2d 918,942 (Wash. 1986) (Dore, J., dissenting) cert. dismissed 479 U.S. 1050
(1987) (characterizing injunction that prevents picketing outside abortion clinic as prior
restraints); Harvard Law Review Association, Note, Too Close For Comfort: Protesting
OutsideMedicalFacilities,101 HARV. L. REv. 1856,1873(1988). SeegenerallyM. NIMER,
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 4.03-4.04, at 4-14-4-25 (student ed. 1984); see also
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
73. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791.
74. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
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denial to implement a strict scrutiny standard, 5 Before announcing
any standard, the Court engaged in a brief litany concerning three
critical differences between injunctions and ordinances.7 First, relying
on United States v. W.T Grant Co.,7 the Court explained that ordinances illustrate legislative preferences for championing particular
societal interests.'8 Injunctions, on the other hand, are remedies for
past and threatened violations of judicial or legislative orders. 79
Second, the Court deduced that injunctions carried greater risks of
discriminatory application and censorship than common ordinances.s'
Third, the Court reasoned that injunctions have an obvious advantage
over ordinances since they can be narrowly tailored by a judge to provide
more precise relief than a statute.8" Keeping these three distinctions
in mind, the Court remarked that the Madsen injunction "require[d] a
somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment
principles 8 2 than an ordinance.s' In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist
asserted that a "standard time, place, and manner analysis [was] not
sufficiently rigorous."' A trail was thus blazed for the Court to fashion
a novel standard for content-neutral injunctions that restrict protected
speech. Relying on NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co." and Carroll
M twelve and sixteen
v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne,"
year old decisions respectfully, the Court forged a new criterion 7 which

75. Id. at 2524.
76. Id.

77. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
78. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632-33).
79. Id.

80. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. "[Tlhere is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally." Id. (quoting Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)).
81. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
It is important to note that Judge McGregor found that petitioners had violated beth of the
previous injunctions before he issued the September 30, 1992 amended permanent
injunction. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667-68.
82. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
83. Further distinguishing an injunction from an ordinance, the Court, summoning
general equity principles, stated Webster's that "an injunction issues only if there is a
showing that the defendant has violated, or imminently will violate, some provision of
statutory or common law, and that there is a 'cognizable danger of recurrent violation.'"
Id. at 2525 n.3 (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633).
84. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
85. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
86. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
87. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, asserting that the majority manufactured a new rule
without giving it a name, called the new standard intermediate-intermediate scrutiny,
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requires the challenged provisions of a content-neutral, speech-restricting injunction to burden no more speech than is necessary to serve a
significant government interest.s' In justifying this rule, the Court
followed ClaiborneHardware'sthat when sanctionable "conduct occurs
in the context of constitutionally protected activity ... 'precision of
regulation' is demanded." 9 The corollary, according to the Court, is a
standard, one that requires an injunction to burden no more speech than
necessary, that equates with or rather exemplifies precision of regulation." After revealing the applicable standard, the Court examined the
state's interests protected by the injunction to determine whether they
were significant."1 Once, again, the Supreme Court deferred to the
Florida Supreme Court's three-fold determination that state interests
were sufficient to warrant the injunction. 2 First, the Florida Supreme
Court, relying on Roe v. Wade," noted that Florida had a keen interest
in protecting a woman's freedom to seek medical services in connection
with her pregnancy." Second, the Florida Supreme Court concluded
that Florida had a strong interest "in ensuring the public safety and
order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and
sidewalks, and in protecting the property rights of all its citizens.'
Third, the Florida Supreme Court held that a state's strong interest in

implying that this standard lay somewhere in between intermediate scrutiny and
heightened scrutiny. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 916). The
Court relies on both Claiborne Hardware Co. and Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor
Dairies,Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), for the universal notion that courts should ensure that
injunctions are not broader than necessary to achieve their desired goals. Madsen, 114 S.
Ct. at 2525; Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 912 n.47; see also Carroll, 393 U.S. at
183-84.
89. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 916
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); see also Carroll, 393 U.S. at 184;
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
The Supreme Court essentially grafted the rule that "precision of regulation" is needed
when an injunction is violated in the context of a constitutionally protected activity, e.g.
free speech, onto the general rule for injunctions that the "injunctive relief should be no
more burdensome to the defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702
(1979)); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 418-20 (1977).
The result of this amalgamation is the new standard.
90. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
91. Id. at 2526.
92. Id.
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
95. Id. (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 672).
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residential privacy, recognized in Frisby v. Schultz," applied by
analogy to medical privacy.' After sustaining these conclusions of the
Florida Supreme Court," Chief Justice Rehnquist then turned to the
injunction itself to analyze the challenged provisions under the Court's
new standard." The Court first explained the need for establishing a
thirty-six foot zone was to protect access to the clinic and ensure that
petitioners did not block traffic on the public street in front of Aware
Woman."° Other options were not available given the narrow confines
of the clinic. 101 Allowing protestors to stand in the middle of the street
would obviously block traffic.' ° Allowing protestors to remain on
Aware Woman's sidewalks and driveway would be similarly ineffective,
given the failure of the first order to protect access.'0 3 The Court,
relying on Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago,Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,"° then gave deference to the state court's familiarity
with the facts and background of the dispute and held, in somewhat
cryptic fashion, that the thirty-six foot buffer zone around the clinic
entrances and driveway burdened no more speech than necessary to
accomplish Florida's legitimate interests."ce In reaching its holding,
the Court used National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States"'c for the proposition that failure of the previous orders to
accomplish their goals could be considered when evaluating the
constitutionality of the amended injunction.'
Apart from the apparent juxtapositioning of prior standards and fusion
of obscure rules, the Court's decision in Madsen does present a new
criterion uniquely applicable to situations where the government seeks
to enjoin, not regulate, the activities of antiabortion protestors. Whether
this new standard proves to be workable remains to be seen. Perhaps
the future disposition of the Supreme Court will determine the stability
or infirmity of Madsen's ultimate holding. Regardless, several ramifica96. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
97.
98.
99.
100,
101.

Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 672).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2527.
Id.

102. Id.
103.

Id.

104. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
105. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527. The Court later struck down the portion of the zone
that encompassed private property to the north and the west of the clinic because it
burdened more speech than necessary to protect access to the clinic. Id. at 2528.
106. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
107. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing National Soc'y of ProfessionalEng'rs,435 U.S.

at 697-98).

1995]

MADSEN

1209

tions will remain interminable. Prochoice groups and their supporters
will be immensely pleased with Madsen'° and prolife organizations
and their sympathizers will not."c While the issue of abortion will be
the focal point of any debate over Madsen, it is not an abortion case.
This decision does not affect the legality of a woman's right to have an
abortion and does not strip away any tax-exempt status currently
enjoyed by abortion facilities. Madsen involves First Amendment
jurisprudence and concerns the ability of the government to enjoin those
seeking to exercise protected freedoms in the face of competing, profound
state interests. Aside from such generalities, what does this case really
mean, in practical terms? First and foremost, when the curtailment of
First Amendment freedoms is sought through injunctive relief, as
opposed to legislative, the time-honored time, place and manner analysis
will no longer be applicable. In one, intermediate scrutiny is gone.
From now on, injunctions like these will require either of two forms of
heightened scrutiny. Second, the communicative impact of the injunction must still be closely examined to determine if the order is contentneutral or content-based. If a court decides the injunction is contentbased, then it will apply a strict or heightened scrutiny analysis. If, on
other hand, a court decides the injunction is content-neutral, the Court
will apply the new intermediate-intermediate scrutiny,"' as Justice
Scalia calls it, will be called upon and precision of regulation will be
looked for. Third, the State must still present cognizable, legitimate,
significant interests which are threatened by the activities of those
exercising their protected rights. Scholars will debate whether the Court
constructed its new standard from antiquated, grave-ridden rules,
whether the Court improperly consolidated and restructured unsuitable
precedents, whether the Court let the emotional juggernaut that is

108. Eleanor Smeal, president of the Feminist Majority Foundation said the decision
was "a good omen for the 40 other local and state injunctions in place" and "[h]aving Chief
Justice Rehnquist hand down the decision makes it stronger."
Laurence Gold, an attorney for the AFL-CIO, who filed an amicus brief in Madsen, called
the majority opinion "sound and reasonable." Mr. Gold did not want the Court to inhibit
labor and other picketing. Joan Biskupic, Court Allows Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones,
Scalia Sees Threat To Free Speech Rights, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 1, 1994, at Al.

109. Before the Court handed down the ruling, Jay Sekulow, chief counsel for Pat
Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice, stated "You cannot silence robust,
provocative, debate-producing speech just because you don't like it." In a similar vein,
Steven McFarland, director for the Center for Law and Religious Freedom, proclaimed
"This is a frontal assault on perhaps the last place where citizens can express themselves the public sidewalk." Elsa C. Arnett, Abortion-Clinic War: Free Speech vs. Free Access,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, April 25, 1994, at Al.

110. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting) and see supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
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abortion in modem America get in the way of otherwise sound legal
reasoning, or whether the Court adopted a sensible, workable standard
for a presently recurring dilemma. Regardless, the Court did established
a benchmark, unique for injunctions, by which to measure court orders
that attempt to quell the First Amendment freedoms of American
citizens.
RIcHARD A. GRIGGS

